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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, the California Legislature enacted a very confusing statute1
* Agnes Roddy Robb Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt
Hall).
1. As enacted in 1987, California Civil Code section 1714.45 provided:
(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe
by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary
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that some have read to give tobacco companies rather sweeping
“immunity” from tort litigation.2 Ten years later the California
Legislature reversed itself, overturning a portion of the prior statute, by
adding new provisions that also contain confusing language.3 At a
knowledge common to the community; and
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as
identified in comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term “product liability action”
means any action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the
term does not include an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach
of an express warranty.
(c) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or
amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
(1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121, and shall apply to all product liability actions
pending on, or commenced after, January 1, 1988.
Willie L. Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, 1987
Cal. Stat. 5777, 5778–79 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (Deering Supp.
2000)).
2. Martin R. Glick & H. Joseph Escher III, Personal Choice and Civil Code
Section 1714.45: An Epilogue for California’s Smoking and Health Litigation, 25 CAL.
W. L. REV. 239, 239 (1989); see Paul Glastris, Frank Fat’s Napkin: How the Trial
Lawyers (and the Doctors!) Sold Out to the Tobacco Companies, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec.
1987, at 19. Glick and Escher were and Escher remains counsel to R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company. See also Darren O’Leary Aitken, Note, The Product Liability
Provision of the Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987: An Evaluation of Its Impact and
Scope, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1989).
3. In 1997 the statute was amended to provide:
(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be
liable if both of the following apply:
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be
unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community.
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, and butter, as identified in
comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
(b) This section does not exempt the manufacture or sale of tobacco
products by tobacco manufacturers and their successors in interest from
product liability actions, but does exempt the sale or distribution of tobacco
products by any other person, including, but not limited to, retailers or
distributors.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term “product liability action”
means any action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the
term does not include an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach
of an express warranty.
(d) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or
amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
(1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121, and shall apply to all product liability actions
pending on, or commenced after, January 1, 1988.
(e) This section does not apply to, and never applied to, an action
brought by a public entity to recover the value of benefits provided to
individuals injured by a tobacco-related illness caused by the tortious
conduct of a tobacco company or its successor in interest, including, but
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minimum, the 1997 changes eliminate any immunity that the prior law
might have created (at least for the future).
The California Supreme Court has now taken a case that concerns the
interpretation of these two pieces of legislation.4 A major focus of the
tobacco companies and the claimants is on whether the 1997 amendment
is only prospective in its effect, a conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeal.5 However, the case also raises a second important issue
concerning what sorts of claims the old law actually barred.
Quite apart from the retroactivity issue, the plaintiffs’ lawyers argued
that at least some of their clients’ claims against the tobacco company
defendants (for example, claims based on fraud and misrepresentation)
were valid even during the decade when the old law was in effect.
Hence, whatever immunity that old law might have provided, it did not
preclude these types of claims. Plaintiffs’ conclusion is supported in this
Article, but for reasons that are quite different from the arguments they
not limited to, an action brought pursuant to Section 14124.71 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code. In such an action brought by a public
entity, the fact that the injured individual’s claim against the defendant may
be barred by a prior version of this section shall not be a defense. This
subdivision does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, existing
law relating to tobacco products.
(f) It is the intention of the Legislature in enacting the amendments to
subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section adopted at the 1997–98 Regular
Session to declare that there exists no statutory bar to tobacco-related
personal injury, wrongful death, or other tort claims against tobacco
manufacturers and their successors in interest by California smokers or
others who have suffered or incurred injuries, damages, or costs arising
from the promotion, marketing, sale, or consumption of tobacco products.
It is also the intention of the Legislature to clarify that such claims which
were or are brought shall be determined on their merits, without the
imposition of any claim of statutory bar or categorical defense.
(g) This section shall not be construed to grant immunity to a tobacco
industry research organization.
Act of Sept. 29, 1997, ch. 570, sec. 1, § 1714.45, 1997 Cal. Chapters 1, 1–2 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (1997)) (amended 1998). Section 1714.45 was
amended again in 1998, but the changes were not substantive. Act of Sept. 14, 1998, ch.
485, sec. 38 § 1714.45, 1998 Cal. Chapters 1, 34–35 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714.45 (1998)). For discussions of the 1997 amendment, see Rodney R. Moy,
Tobacco Companies, Immune No More—California’s Removal of the Legal Barriers
Preventing Plaintiffs from Recovering for Tobacco-Related Illness, 29 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 761 (1998); Benjamin C. Graves, Note, Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.: The
Pyrrhic Victory of Proposition 51 and the Death of Fault Immunity for Tobacco, 33
U.S.F. L. REV. 459 (1999).
4. Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 11 P.3d 953 (Cal. 2000).
5. Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 677–78 (2000).
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have advanced in the case. The Court of Appeal summarily dealt with
this issue in favor of the defendants.6
It is argued here that the 1987 statute should be read only to bar claims
that are based upon legal theories at odds with comment i to section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.7 As of 1987, no California
case had rejected comment i. However, developments in New Jersey,
arguments in the scholarly literature, and dicta in a key opinion of the
California Supreme Court (all discussed below) created a concern
among potential defendants that the California Supreme Court might be
headed towards rejecting comment i, and that such a step could mean
imposing sweeping product liability on makers of inherently unsafe
products like cigarettes.
Hence, the 1987 statute, which itself
specifically refers to comment i, should be understood as a legislative
decision to head off the possibility that the common law would evolve in
that way. This interpretation of the 1987 statute not only makes
6. Id. at 678.
7. Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Comment i provides:
i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only
where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe
for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of
harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to
diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture.
That is not what is meant by “unreasonably dangerous” in this Section. The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk,
and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a
dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be
unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to
heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is
unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
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reasonable sense of its confusing language, but also reflects the state of
thinking about tobacco tort claims at the time it was enacted.
Under this interpretation, the plaintiffs’ legal claims in Naegele that
are based on fraud, conspiracy, and perhaps on other theories, should not
be barred by the 1987 statute because such claims are not precluded by
comment i. Whether plaintiffs can actually prove all the necessary
elements of these permissible claims is quite another matter. But
according to this interpretation of the 1987 statute, plaintiffs should at
least be entitled to try.
II. BACKGROUND
Before 1963, lawsuits in California by victims of product injuries were
either handled under principles of negligence or they were cast as
contract claims that drew on “implied warranty” principles.8 For
example, if someone bought a loaf of bread from a local bakery, took a
bite out of the loaf, and it turned out that a sharp pin hidden in the bread
injured the person, the victim could sue the bakery (1) in tort, claiming
that the bakery negligently allowed the pin to get into the bread, or (2) in
contract, claiming that in providing this sort of bread the bakery
breached implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. (More
likely, the plaintiff’s lawyer would assert both tort and contract claims.)
A. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.9 and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts
Starting with the Greenman case in 1963, the California Supreme
Court broke new ground by adopting the principle of “strict liability in
tort” as a basis of recovery for injury caused by defectively
manufactured products such as the bread with a pin in it.10 Negligence
and warranty claims were essentially rendered obsolete in these settings,
and in the above example the bakery would be liable to the victim
regardless of fault because the bread the victim bought and that caused
the injury was obviously “defective.” To be more precise, the major
doctrinal change this decision brought about on the tort side was that the
plaintiff no longer had to prove that the bakery had failed to exercise due
8. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (affirming
judgment for the plaintiff based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).
9. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
10. Id. at 900.
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care in allowing the pin to get into the bread; it sufficed that the pin was
there when the plaintiff bought the loaf.11
In Greenman, the California Supreme Court embraced the rule that
Justice Roger Traynor had advocated many years earlier in his now
famous concurring opinion in the Escola case.12 In that opinion, Traynor
argued for strict liability in tort on a wide range of policy grounds,
including considerations of justice, accident prevention, compensation of
victims, and administrative simplification.13
At the time of Greenman, Dean William Prosser of the Law School at
University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) was serving as the Chief
Reporter for the American Law Institute as it worked to revise the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, originally issued in the 1930s.14
Prosser seized on his former faculty colleague Traynor’s views, just then
adopted in Greenman, and convinced the American Law Institute to
endorse what became section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.15 As others have recounted, it was hardly the case that the
California position could be fairly said to “restate” the common law
throughout America at the time.16 But owing either to Prosser’s
prescience or a combination of his persuasiveness and the persuasiveness of
the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Greenman, in a short period
of time the basic principle embodied in section 402A did become the law
nearly everywhere in the nation.17 Indeed, many jurisdictions cited
section 402A as a reason for adopting the principle of strict liability in
tort,18 thereby rendering it a true restatement of the law.
11. See id. at 900–01. Under prior tort doctrine, the plaintiff almost surely could
have invoked res ipsa loquitur in such a case, which, in effect, forced the defendant to
show that he was not negligent in allowing the pin to get into the bread, and which, as a
practical matter, pretty much amounted to the same thing as strict liability.
12. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 155, 163 (1980); George L. Priest, The Invention
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 461, 512, 517 n.358 (1985).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Priest, supra note 14, at
465, 513–14 (stating that after Greenman, “Prosser was back at the 1964 meetings of the
[ALI] with a third draft—the present section 402A—that extended the strict liability
standard to all products”).
16. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 14, at 513–18; Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword:
Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 435, 438 (1979).
17. See Priest, supra note 14, at 518.
18. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 187, 188 (Ill. 1965)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A to support the court’s conclusion that
a manufacturer of a brake system came within the rule of strict liability); Buttrick v.
Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111, 113 (N.H. 1969) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A as the basis for applying a rule of strict liability in
manufacturing defect cases); Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966) (citing
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Prosser and Traynor realized that holding defendants strictly liable for
defectively manufactured products was the analytically easy part. Those
products plainly did not conform to what either the manufacturer or the
consumer wanted. If a carbonated beverage bottle exploded and injured
you, or a candy bar contained an impurity that made you ill, or a
mismade wheel fell off your car causing it to crash, the product was
obviously defective. But not all product injuries come about from
products that are defective in this way. In the years after Greenman,
most tort scholars have adopted, as a matter of analytical convenience,
two other main categories of defective products: products that are
defective in design and products that are defective as to their warning.19
These three categories of defects—manufacturing, design, and
warning—by no means imply that there is tort liability for all product
injuries. To the contrary, most product-related injuries that occur are not
the result of product defects,20 and in those cases, if the plaintiff sues, the
defendant should win. For example, if you fall off a well-made ladder
and injure yourself, you probably will not be able to win a case against
the ladder maker. Or, if you cut yourself with a sharp knife, you
probably will not be able to win a case against the knife maker.
Prosser does not seem to have foreseen the full range of product injury
cases that might occur, and he did not expressly embrace the threefold
categorization of defects in section 402A. But he clearly had some
important insights into the looming question of how broadly the strict
liability principle should sweep. Prosser dealt with that issue in two
ways. First, he restricted strict liability to products with defects, and
then he defined “defect” in a way so as to exclude cases in which he felt
there should be no strict liability. Specifically, section 402A applies
strict liability to the seller of “any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.”21 Second, Prosser
added comments to section 402A, as is typical in the Restatement,
several of which describe certain types of harms that he felt were outside
of a fair understanding of those caused by defective products. These
included the now famous comment i, in which Prosser specifically
singled out tobacco products (as well as whiskey, butter, castor oil, and
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A and adopting it “as the law of Pennsylvania”).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
20. Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 2403, 2419–23 (2000).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
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sugar).22
In comment i, Prosser’s analysis was that even if tobacco products
were inherently dangerous, they were nevertheless not normally
“unreasonably” dangerous because, he assumed, the dangers of
cigarettes were known to the ordinary consumer and they simply could
not be made safe. (It is perhaps worth recalling in this respect that
section 402A was adopted in the same year the famous Surgeon
General’s report was issued that linked smoking to lung cancer and other
diseases.)23 Put differently, as Prosser saw it, “unreasonably” dangerous
products are either products that are more dangerous than expected or
products that can be made safer. And those, and only those, are products
to which liability should attach regardless of fault.
Notice how, without specifically saying so, Prosser’s understanding
broadly covers the three categories of defects that legal analysts
generally talk about today: design defects occur when products can be
made safer, and products are generally more dangerous than expected
when there is either a manufacturing or warning defect. Prosser also
notes in passing that if a specific tobacco product were secretly laced
with dangerous impurities, it would be a defective product (what we now
call a manufacturing defect). His example, which may seem quaint now,
was tobacco that contained marijuana.24
Although section 402A was viewed from the outset as capturing (or
creating) a very important expansion in tort law, in the scholarly
literature of the 1960s and 1970s some writers were advocating an even
more sweeping approach to strict liability in tort—one that went well
beyond what Traynor and Prosser had initially imagined. Perhaps the
broadest view holds that all of the accident costs associated with a
product should be internalized into the cost of that product, whether or
not the product was “defective” as that notion was understood under the
Restatement’s definition.25 For example, well-known but unavoidable
side effects of valuable pharmaceutical drugs would be considered as
22.
23.

Id. § 402A cmt. i.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH:
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE (1964).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i. Perhaps Prosser was moved
to give that example as he witnessed life in Berkeley in the 1960s.
25. For some flavor of this “enterprise liability” approach and recent attempts to
reinvigorate it, see generally, VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(1995); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case
for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund
Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort Theory, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 59 (1999); Robert L.
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190
(1996).
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part of the costs of those drugs, to be internalized in their price through
the tort system. Under this view of sweeping strict liability, tort law
would force all buyers to pay more for their drugs, but the unlucky ones
who suffered the side effects would be compensated for their losses via
the tort system. Using strict liability as a way to provide compensation
for victims was certainly one of the policy goals Traynor pointed to in
his early advocacy of strict liability for what we now call manufacturing
defects.
The cost internalization approach would move the difficult products
liability analysis up to a different level. That is, if the Restatement’s
definition of defect were abandoned, exactly which accident costs should
be properly understood to be associated with which product? For
example, suppose someone is hurt falling off a ladder onto the patio
while cleaning the gutters. Is this a cost to be associated with gutters?
With ladders? With patios? With the nursery that sold the victim the
trees whose leaves were in the gutters? Guido Calabresi, then a law
professor and now a federal appellate court judge, attacked this issue
with gusto in many brilliant pieces over several years.26 He argued that
accident costs should be assigned to what he termed the “cheapest . . .
cost avoider.”27
In the end, this sort of sweeping approach to strict liability has never
really caught on in the courts. Indeed, as to the example given above of
known, but unavoidable, side effects of a pharmaceutical drug, courts
around the country have by now largely agreed that if an adequate
warning has been provided, the product is not defective.28 Prosser
himself favored this result, as comment k to section 402A makes clear.29
Nevertheless, back in the 1970s and 1980s, it seemed quite possible
that the California Supreme Court would embrace a substantially wider
role for strict liability in tort than the Restatement contemplated. For
one thing, on several occasions, and most forcefully in Cronin v. J.B.E.

26. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An
Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972).
27. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
135 (1970).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(b)(3), (d) (1997).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k.
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Olson Corp. in 1972,30 the California Supreme Court made clear that, in
contrast to the Restatement, “unreasonably dangerous” was not part of
the test of product liability in California.31 Rather, it was held sufficient
to show that the product is “defective.”32 To the California Supreme
Court, Prosser’s definition of defect in section 402A sounded too much
like negligence.33 That is, the Restatement’s phrase “defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer”34 sounded too much
like the negligence law that strict liability was intended to replace. After
all, negligence itself is about dangers that are unreasonably created
because they should have been avoided.
Just what defective would mean in California, however, was not
determined in Cronin. Because the actual cases coming before the
California Supreme Court through the Cronin case seemed to be either
cases of manufacturing defects or cases of negligent designs, the
ultimate scope of California law was left unresolved. Greenman, for
example, seemed to involve a poorly designed shop tool.35 Cronin
seemed to involve a hasp on a delivery truck that was either poorly
designed or defectively manufactured.36
B. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.37 and the Possibilities of
Footnote 10
In 1978 the California Supreme Court decided the Barker case, in
which the plaintiff was injured when a high-lift loader he was operating
overturned.38 The plaintiff’s claim, in effect, was that the loader was
defectively designed.39 The trial court had charged the jury using the
Restatement’s definition of defect, but the California Supreme Court
rejected that instruction, reaffirming Cronin’s holding that the
“unreasonably dangerous” language of the Restatement was not the law
in California.40
What then would constitute a defective design? The California
Supreme Court answered that there were two bases on which that might
be determined. First, the product might be found to have “failed to
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect”41 (known now
as the “consumer expectations” prong of Barker). Or, second, the
product’s design could be found to embody an “excessive preventable
danger,” as a case in which “the risk of the danger inherent in the
challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design”42 (known now
as the “risk-benefit” prong of Barker).
The California Supreme Court apparently thought that this risk-benefit
test itself sounded rather like the negligence concept it had rejected in
Cronin. Hence, two additional features were added to the test: (1) it
would be applied by the jury “through hindsight,” and (2) once the
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden would shift to the
defendant to prove that the product passes the risk-benefit test.43
By itself, Barker’s holding on the law of strict liability in California
should not have been threatening to cigarette makers. In setting out the
risk-benefit prong, the California Supreme Court emphasized that the
key question under that test was a comparison between the actual design
and a proposed safer alternative.44 And, at that point, no one was
suggesting a safer cigarette was possible. Under the consumer
expectations prong, tobacco companies were reasonably content to rest
on the argument that smokers knew what they were getting into when
they decided to smoke. This is often deemed the “assumption of risk”
defense.45 In addition, the defendants could assert “no causation” in
response to inadequate warning claims; that is, the defendants could
argue that the plaintiff could not show that any other warning would
have made any difference in the plaintiff’s smoking behavior.
However, and highly significant for purposes of the case now before
the California Supreme Court, in footnote 10 of Barker, Acting Chief
Justice Tobriner stated for the California Supreme Court: “[W]e have no
occasion to determine whether a product which entails a substantial risk
of harm may be found defective even if no safer alternative design is
feasible.”46 Justice Tobriner then went out of his way to quote from an

41. Id. at 454.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 454–55.
44. Id. at 455.
45. This idea is better understood simply to be a claim that the product was not
defective because the plaintiff could not show that its warning was inadequate. Stephen
D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 857–59 (1997).
46. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10.
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earlier opinion of the California Supreme Court47 that, in passing, cited a
law review article written by Justice Traynor subsequent to the
Greenman decision,48 in which Justice Traynor suggested that “liability
might be imposed as to products whose norm is danger.”49
At least two new and expanded notions of strict products liability lurk
in footnote 10, both of which could be extremely threatening to tobacco
companies. One is that the California Supreme Court would allow the
risk-benefit test to be applied to the product itself, with the alternative
being no product at all (rather than a safer design). Here looms the
possibility that a jury could decide that, as a social matter, the risks of
smoking outweigh the benefits, and therefore cigarettes are “defective”
products. In effect, a jury might conclude that manufacturers have no
more business selling cigarettes than they have selling shop tools that
could be more safely designed.
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court took a step down this very
road five years after Barker in O’Brien v. Muskin.50 There, the plaintiff
dove into a three and one-half feet deep, vinyl-lined, above-ground
swimming pool, struck his head on the bottom, and sustained serious
injuries.51 The New Jersey Supreme Court sent the case back for retrial
on the central ground that the trial court should have allowed the jury to
find that the “risk posed by the pool outweighed its utility” even if “there
are no alternative methods” of making the pool safer.52
A second possibility raised by footnote 10 in Barker is that strict
liability should attach to very dangerous products, whether or not they
fail the risk-benefit test. Simply put, the argument would be, not that all
accident costs should be internalized into all products that cause them,
but rather that accident costs should be internalized into highly
dangerous products. This approach might avoid the dilemma raised by
the earlier example of someone falling off a ladder while cleaning the
gutters.53
Because this latter approach would essentially discard the “defect”
requirement, it would, in turn, raise a new difficulty. Precisely what
would make a product sufficiently dangerous to trigger this form of strict
liability? One possibility is to seek help from the law of “abnormally
47. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 482 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1971).
48. Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
49. Jiminez, 482 P.2d at 684; Traynor, supra note 48, at 368.
50. O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
51. Id. at 302.
52. Id. at 306. The New Jersey court, in a different context, had already embraced
true strict liability beyond the manufacturing defect setting in its 1982 decision in
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982).
53. See supra Part II.A.
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dangerous activities,” covered by sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, since that is the area of tort law in which strict
liability is imposed on uncommon activities that are highly dangerous.54
Alternatively, courts might simply have to be content with a
traditional common law evolution of a doctrine of strict liability for
highly dangerous products on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, perhaps
such a doctrine would prove to be unstable at the margins (as a similar
rule about “things imminently dangerous to life” proved difficult to
apply in a coherent manner in the early law governing manufacturer
liability for negligently made products before it was swept away in
Judge Cardozo’s famous MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. decision in
1916).55 For tobacco companies, however, concerns about the details
and borders of a potential rule of strict liability for highly dangerous
products were beside the point. If any product was going to attract strict
liability because its “norm is danger,”56 it would be hard to imagine a
more promising candidate than cigarettes.
In short, under either of these possible extensions of product liability
law, comment i to section 402A would be rejected.
As it turns out, in the more than two decades since Barker, the
California Supreme Court has not followed up on Justice Tobriner’s
intimations in footnote 10. In the same vein, the new Restatement
(Third) of Torts asserts (albeit over the vigorous dissent of some
members57) that warning and design defect cases really are negligence
cases—the product is only defective if, at the time it was put into the
market, it could have been more safely designed or could have carried a
more adequate warning.58 To be sure, in some of the California

54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–20 (1977).
55. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051–52 (N.Y. 1916) (citing
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), and discussing the problematic earlier rule
developed in sources cited).
56. See sources cited supra note 49 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability
and the Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227
(1997); Howard A. Latin, The Preliminary Draft of a Proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability—Letter 15 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIABILITY 169 (1993)
(addressing the American Law Institute); John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes:
The American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability
Design Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV.
493 (1996); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus
on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867 (1998).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1–2 (1977).

1063

SURGARMAN.DOC

3/2/2020 4:08 PM

Supreme Court’s more recent opinions59 it has continued to insist that, in
contrast to the Restatement (Third), strict product liability in California
remains truly “strict” and is not really negligence law. Nonetheless, the
actual outcomes of those more recent cases make clear that the sweeping
strict liability suggested by footnote 10 in Barker has not been adopted.60
However, in 1987, when the statute at issue here was enacted, the
picture was much less clear. For example, in 1985 the California
Supreme Court imposed strict liability on landlords (for defective
products provided in the apartments they leased).61
III. THE 1987 STATUTE
If one looks at the situation as of 1987, as it has been characterized
here, then one can make sense of what the California Legislature seems
to have been trying to do with section 1714.45. Simply put, the
Legislature was trying to enact Prosser’s comment i to section 402A as
the law of California. That is what subsection (a) of the statute is all
about. Indeed, note that subsection (a)(2) specifically mentions comment
i, and it lists the very products that Prosser named.62 If one understands
subsection (a) as so intended, one can then make sense of subsections (b)
and (c) as well.
Subsection (b) makes clear that the statute does not preclude
manufacturing defect or express warranty claims,63 which, of course,
comment i also never intended to prevent. Comment i, as explained at
length above,64 meant to preclude plaintiffs from succeeding with what
we now know as design or warning defect claims where there was no
safer alternative and the danger was well understood. That is, comment i
meant to preclude a more extravagant expansion of strict liability to
well-understood consumer products whose “norm was danger.” Clearly,
both defectively manufactured products, and products that manufacturers
promised to be safe but were not, were well outside comment i, and
subsection (b) of the statute simply confirms that.
The purpose of subsection (c) now also becomes clear. It plainly
59. See, e.g., Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1354–55 & n.7 (Cal. 1996);
Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 304 (Cal. 1994); Anderson v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991).
60. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California
Experience with “New” Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 478–82 (1999).
61. Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 122 (Cal. 1985), overruled by Peterson v.
Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 920 (Cal. 1995).
62. See Willie L. Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch.
1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5777, 5778–79 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45
(Deering Supp. 2000)).
63. See id.
64. See supra Part II.A.
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states that the statute is not intended to roll back plaintiffs’ rights and
thereby cut back on any existing liability that defendants had in 1987.65
Rather, to repeat, the point of subsection (c) is to reemphasize that
subsection (a) is intended to preclude the California Supreme Court from
expanding plaintiff rights by rejecting comment i in one or both of the
ways suggested in Barker’s footnote 10, in New Jersey’s O’Brien case,
and in the scholarly literature. Regardless of how one feels about it as a
policy matter, this was a legitimate action for the California Legislature
to take.
Under the above interpretation, section 1714.45, as enacted in 1987,
adopts the position that, for common personal consumption products that
are known to be dangerous, the decision whether their risks exceed their
benefits should be made in the market by individual consumers. Put
differently, jurors in an individual case should not decide that question
for all Californians (or paternalistically for the plaintiff in that case).
This position has considerable appeal, and it implicitly underlies
Prosser’s thinking. Moreover, this notion of letting the market rather
than juries decide such matters has, in practice, swept the field in the
years since O’Brien. No other state took up New Jersey’s lead, and the
New Jersey Legislature has essentially repealed the O’Brien principle.66
Furthermore, this limited reach of products liability law is now
essentially the position of the Restatement (Third)—albeit with a
carefully worded and tiny escape valve that could permit a jury to
impose strict liability on a ridiculously dangerous product with a
“manifestly unreasonable design,”67 perhaps such as sharp, metal-tipped,
children’s lawn darts. And while some tobacco control advocates would
assert that cigarettes are no better, yea, even worse, than those lawn
darts, no court has yet taken tort law down that road in tobacco
litigation.68 In short, rationales for expanding strict products liability
that underlie the possibilities suggested by Barker’s footnote 10
(however attractive) have failed to carry the day. Yet, this subsequent
evolution of the law was by no means certain in 1987.
65. See ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. at 5778–79.
66. N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 2000).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (1977).
68. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on Cigarette Litigation Under the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 487, 506–08 (1998)
(exploring the new Restatement (Third) section 2, comments d and e, and the removal of
tobacco products from the list Prosser had developed for comment i to the old section
402A).
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IV. LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 1714.45
Unfortunately, the understanding of section 1714.45 presented above
was not embraced in 1989 by the court of appeal in American Tobacco
Co. v. Superior Court,69 and that decision led to the court of appeal’s
decision in Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.70 The California
Supreme Court, however, is now presented with the opportunity to adopt
the interpretation of section 1714.45 proposed here.
A. American Tobacco
Soon after the 1987 statute was passed, California courts were called
upon to interpret it. American Tobacco involved eleven separate
lawsuits for personal injury and wrongful death filed by plaintiffs’
lawyers against several tobacco companies.71 The plaintiffs’ lawyers
adopted a strategy as to how to interpret section 1714.45 that convinced
the trial court judge, but which, on appeal, turned out to be too clever.
Notice that the full text of subsection (a) of section 1714.45 provided:
(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be
unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community; and
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as
identified in comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.72

The plaintiffs in American Tobacco argued that, in order to claim the
benefit of subsection (a), the defendants had to show that they met both
subsection (1) and subsection (2) – which is certainly a plausible, if
technical, reading of the language given the “and” between subsections
(1) and (2). The plaintiffs then argued that in order for defendants to
satisfy subsection (1) they had to admit that their product is “inherently
unsafe,” and the plaintiffs’ lawyers rightly counted on the tobacco
companies to refuse to do that.
At that time, in litigation around the nation, the tobacco companies
were still arguing that there was no proof that cigarettes caused any
injuries, and hence it could be seen as completely inconsistent with their
public posture, and perhaps even disastrous in future litigation, if the
69. 255 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1989).
70. 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666 (Ct. App. 2000) review granted, 11 P.3d 953 (Cal. 2000).
71. 255 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
72. Willie L. Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch. 1498,
§ 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5777, 5778–79 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45
(Deering Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
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tobacco companies were to admit, even insist, that their products were
indeed “inherently unsafe.”73 Today, tobacco companies appear to
concede that there is somewhat of a scientific consensus that cigarette
smoking leads to tobacco-related disease, although the companies may
hedge as to their own positions on the issue.74
The court of appeal in American Tobacco rejected the plaintiffs’
interpretation, however. It found the text of subsection (a) baffling and
turned to the legislative history of section 1714.45. Because (as
recounted elsewhere) this section was one part of a pact reached one
night in a well-known Sacramento restaurant, rushed through the
legislature without committee hearings, and passed by both houses on
the same day,75 none of the usual sorts of legislative history were
available. Instead, the court of appeal pointed primarily to a memo
prepared for the Assembly Republican Caucus and a letter written by the
president of the California Trial Lawyers’ Association (CTLA), both of
which stated that section 1714.45 was intended to apply to tobacco
products.76
In effect, the court of appeal read subsection (2) as intended, not to
provide an additional requirement, but instead merely to provide a list of
examples of some of the products that satisfied the “inherently unsafe”
and “known to be unsafe” requirements of subsection (1). On that
reading, the defendants would not have to admit that tobacco products
are “inherently unsafe,” but rather could simply note that, for the
purposes of strict products liability, the legislation so identified them. In
other words, to give effect to the legislative intent the court found in the
memo and letter described above, it effectively read the “and” between
subsections (1) and (2) out of the statute.77
One can sympathize with the court of appeal’s puzzlement over the
words of the statute. What was the point of having a separate subsection
(2) that seemed on its face to provide an additional requirement, when
73. Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort
Liability, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110, 113–15 (Robert L.
Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993); Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the
Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE, supra, at 131, 132.
74. See, e.g., Chris Proctor, British American Tobacco, Smoking and Health, at
http://www.bat.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2001); Philip Morris USA, Health Issues for
Smokers, at http://www.philipmorrisusa.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2001).
75. Glastris, supra note 2, at 19.
76. American Tobacco Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
77. A more aggressive reading of the court of appeal decision is that the court
converted “and” into “or.”
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subsection (2) and its reference to comment i to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) seemed essentially to repeat, with specified
examples, exactly what subsection (1) was stating more generally? To
be sure, subsection (2) includes the phrase “intended for personal
consumption.”78 Yet, that phrase too seems not to create an important
limit on subsection (1). Rather, it merely rephrases the language
“ordinary consumer who consumes” in subsection (1). Subsection (2)
does contain the additional narrowing phrase “common consumer
product”79; but again, that is just a further explication of what the
legislature was talking about when it spoke of products that consumers
knew to be dangerous.
The best way to understand those hastily drafted subsections (a)(1)
and (a)(2), as argued in Part III of this Article, is to see them as a
package designed to embrace Prosser’s ideas as to where to draw the line
on strict liability, as expressed in comment i, and thereby to head off
California courts from imposing strict liability on products like
cigarettes merely because they are “inherently unsafe” (at least when
those dangers were well-known to those who consumed those products).
On this score, the American Tobacco decision (and the memo and letter
to which the opinion referred) was correct: section 1714.45(a) was
indeed meant to apply to tobacco products, and to apply without any
additional proof or concession by defendants on a case-by-case basis that
their products were “inherently unsafe.” However, the court of appeal
stumbled when it stated the implications of this interpretation of
subsection (a) and its compatibility with subsection (c), which flatly
states that section 1714.45 as a whole was not meant to change
California law, but only to declare it.
The court of appeal jumped to the conclusion that, by rejecting
plaintiffs’ interpretation of the interaction of subsections (a)(1) and
(a)(2), it somehow had to find that subsection (a) as a whole gave the
tobacco companies “immunity” from liability (discussed more below).
The court of appeal stated that giving “immunity” to these defendants
did change California law—since before the statute was passed,
plaintiffs had the right to claim that cigarettes were “defective” products
under either prong of the two-part Barker test. Having reached that
conclusion, the court of appeal found subsection (c)’s statement that the
law was not being changed impossible to support. Hence, the court of
appeal announced that it was reading subsection (c) as not intending to
78. See Willie L. Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch.
1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5777, 5778–79 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45
(Deering Supp. 2000)).
79. See id. (emphasis added).
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change California law “except as specifically provided in section
1714.45.”80
With all due respect, the court’s reading is a misinterpretation of
subsection 1714.45(c). In effect, the court of appeal read subsection (c)
out of the statute altogether. Every statute only changes existing law to
the extent that it does, and so it would seem strange in the extreme to
read subsection (c) as the court did for this statute, when, on its face, it
so clearly says something different. But one can see the dilemma that
the court of appeal was in, given its sweeping take on the implications of
subsection (a), together with its limited analysis of what California law
was before section 1714.45 was adopted.
What the court of appeal seemingly failed to appreciate was that under
the Barker tests, as then developed, plaintiffs would lose their case if
they merely claimed that cigarettes were inherently unsafe consumer
products that users knew were unsafe. If those were the only claims that
subsection (a) barred, then it barred claims that, at the time, were not yet
good claims in California. This is precisely the point.
To repeat, the whole purpose of the original section 1714.45 should be
seen as preventing the California courts from changing the law and
embracing a more sweeping rule that reflected the ideas suggested by
Barker’s footnote 10. This understanding of the legislative intent makes
subsection (c) altogether coherent. It also captures the clear gist of
subsection (a)—as embracing comment i. It does grant a limited
“immunity” to manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products and the
like, but only against claims that they should be held liable to consumers
merely because their products are “inherently unsafe.”
In terms of the exact language of subsection (a), my interpretation
requires only a history-based understanding of the word “if.” Notice
again that subsection (a) starts, “In a product liability action, a
manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if . . . ,” which is then followed
by subsections (1) and (2).81 The “if” should be understood to mean
“because” or “based on claims that” or “on the ground that,” but this “if”
should not mean that “in no event should any such action be allowed.”
In other words, no sweeping immunity should arise from this “if.”
Rather, immunity should only be granted from efforts to reject comment
i. As the CTLA president’s letter stated, “Since the dangers cannot be
80.
81.

American Tobacco Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
See ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. at 5778–79.
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further reduced, minimized or alleviated without removing the product
from the market, product liability suits would only require or cause their
removal. The policy decision has already been made by society in favor
of their availability.”82 The phrase “product liability suits” in the CTLA
letter surely referred to those seeking to deem cigarettes “defective” on
grounds of their inherent dangers alone. Furthermore, as discussed
earlier, the letter concedes that it may be wiser for individuals in society
through their market behavior to conduct the risk-benefit test, rather than
allow a jury to decide that the risks exceed the benefits and thus imply
(as with all other defective products) that cigarettes should no longer be
sold.
Clearly, the CTLA president was not saying that the adoption of
section 1714.45 precluded all product liability suits against tobacco
manufacturers. For one thing, as explored above, subsection (b) itself
expressly notes that claims for manufacturing defect and express
warranty could still be brought.83 Contrary to claims made by the
tobacco companies in their brief to the California Supreme Court in
Naegele,84 there is no good reason to treat subsection (b) as exhaustive.
The California Legislature understandably explicitly reserved victims’
ongoing right to sue on theories that were very familiar and clearly not
intended to be preempted. If subsection (a) is read as suggested here it
only cuts out one specific theory. All other theories are left for the
courts to deal with outside of the statute.
In defining the term “product liability action” as used in subsection
(a), subsection (b) uses the phrase “any action for injury or death caused
by a product.”85 But this definition is no roadblock to the argument
advanced here. The phrase simply means that no matter how a plaintiff
phrases his or her product liability claim, if it seeks to impose liability
where comment i would reject it, that claim is barred.
Suppose that a tobacco company adds a new ingredient to its
cigarettes to enhance their flavor, and suppose it turns out that many
smokers are highly allergic to this ingredient and suffer serious harm
from it. Suppose further that the victims can prove that scientists inside
the company knew of the dangerous nature of the additive and told
managers of the risks, but, because of pressures from the marketing
department, the additive was used anyway. It would be astounding if the
California Supreme Court were to conclude that section 1714.45
82. American Tobacco Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
83. See ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. at 5778–79.
84. Respondents’ Answer Brief at 45–49, Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666 (Ct. App. 2000) (No. S090420), 2001 WL 664446, review granted,
11 P.3d 953 (Cal. 2000).
85. See ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. at 5778–79 (emphasis added).
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precluded lawsuits against that tobacco company for injuries arising
from the additive. However, notice that these lawsuits could readily be
cast as claiming a design defect (there is a safer design without that
additive) or a warning defect (the company should have warned of the
dangers of the additive). Those lawsuits would not raise manufacturing
defect or express warranty claims as covered by subsection (b). But if
the court of appeal’s language in American Tobacco is to be taken
literally, then, under subsection (a), the defendants would be immune
from such claims concerning the additive. Surely, such a result cannot
be right.
Part of the problem stems from the way the court of appeal in
American Tobacco cast the case at the outset. It says simply that the
plaintiffs allege that the victims “became ill, and in some cases died,
allegedly as a result of being exposed to tobacco.”86 This statement
gives no feel whatsoever for the precise nature of their theory of the
case. It is as though the plaintiffs were claiming liability solely on the
basis of causation, which they certainly were not. But the court of
appeal seemed to see no need to go any further into the matter. This
apparently occurred because the case seems to have been understood as
one in which the plaintiffs were conceding that their claims should be
thrown out unless their reading of the statute was accepted (that is, that
the defendants had to admit their products were “inherently unsafe”).
B. Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.87
The interpretation of section 1714.45 set forth in this Article is by no
means precluded by the California Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in
Richards. Richards concerned the application of Proposition 51, adopted by
California voters in 1986, which provides that in cases with multiple
tortfeasors, each defendant is liable only for its share of the victim’s
noneconomic damages (pain and suffering) in proportion to its share of
overall responsibility or fault.88 In Richards, defendant asbestos manufacturers
and employers sought to avoid full responsibility for the noneconomic
losses associated with a smoker plaintiff’s asbestos-related lung injury
by arguing that some of those damages were properly the responsibility
86. American Tobacco Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
87. 928 P.2d 1181 (Cal. 1997).
88. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431–1431.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001) (codifying
initiative measure Proposition 51 as adopted on June 3, 1986).
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of the tobacco companies (who were not named as defendants in the
plaintiff’s case).89
The California Supreme Court treated the issue before it very
narrowly. The asbestos defendants argued that, even if the tobacco
companies were free from direct liability to the plaintiffs under section
1714.45, nonetheless, the asbestos defendants should not have to
shoulder all of the plaintiff’s noneconomic losses (seemingly on the
ground that, absent section 1714.45, the tobacco makers would be liable
to the plaintiffs, a highly uncertain assumption in any event).90
However, the California Supreme Court responded to this argument by
stating that “to the extent section 1714.45 affords tobacco suppliers
immunity,”91 the asbestos makers may not point to those suppliers as a
way of trying to escape from their own full liability to the plaintiff. The
California Supreme Court then made clear in footnote 8 of the Richards
opinion, “[I]t is not necessary to determine the exact substantive scope of
the immunity described by section 1714.45.”92 Indeed, in that footnote
the Court then goes out of its way to say, “[W]e need not and do not take
any position on the exact parameters of the immunity provided by
section 1714.45, or on the correctness of the American Tobacco decision
in this regard.”93
V. APPLYING THE SENSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
1714.45 TO THE NAEGELE CASE
Assuming the California Supreme Court were to interpret section
1714.45 as suggested in this Article, how should the complaint in
Naegele be handled? Clearly, any cause of action seeking strict liability
on the theory of Barker’s footnote 10 (that is, the inherent dangers of
cigarettes) should be barred—at least to the extent that the original
section 1714.45 applies to the case.94 But what of other theories
plaintiffs in tobacco cases might be alleging?
Suppose first that a plaintiff were to claim either that the warnings
given by the defendants as to the dangers of smoking are legally
insufficient, or that cigarettes can in fact be made much safer and the
defendants have failed to do so. In other words, suppose a plaintiff
89. 928 P.2d at 1184.
90. Id. at 1189–90.
91. Id. at 1191 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1193 n.8.
93. Id.
94. This assumes, among other things, that the California Supreme Court finds that
the amended statute is not “retroactive” and that plaintiffs’ claims arose during the time
original section 1714.45 was applicable—two issues on which the author expresses no
opinion here.
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makes legal claims based upon factual assertions that are directly
contrary to Prosser’s understanding of the facts when he drafted
comment i. Prosser, as explained above, assumed cigarettes were inherently
unsafe and that people well understood their dangers (even back in 1964
when the Surgeon General’s first report was released).95 Yet, in 2001, it
is at least possible to imagine plaintiffs mounting factual cases that are
contrary to Prosser’s understanding. For example, suppose a plaintiff
offers to show that a filter, different from the filter that most tobacco
companies now use, really does prevent cancer in smokers. Or suppose
a plaintiff concedes that people have long known that smoking is
dangerous, but argues that young people did not realize how addictive
smoking is, at least during, say, the 1970s and 1980s when they began to
smoke as teenagers and before the Surgeon General’s later report on
“nicotine addiction.”96
Prosser would have said that if such facts were proven then the
predicate for including tobacco products in the list of products he created
for comment i would be undermined. No longer would the product be
inherently unsafe (on the “safer filter” theory) or its dangers well
understood in the community (on the “we did not realize it was
addictive” theory). On such facts, tobacco products no longer illustrate
the principle underlying comment i and should be removed from its list.
It is admittedly a somewhat more difficult question as to how section
1714.45 should be interpreted in the face of factual allegations of the
sort just imagined. The language of the statute reflects the legislature’s
factual understanding at that time that cigarettes were inherently unsafe
and their dangers well known. The question might be thought of as
whether the statute creates a conclusive presumption as to the facts,
regardless of what the plaintiff claims the real facts to be. But the better
way to treat the matter is simply to interpret section 1714.45 in the
narrow way already suggested—that it only rules out more sweeping
strict liability claims based upon “inherent danger.” On that approach,
design and warning defect claims based upon the new factual allegations
imagined here (a “safer filter” or there was a “warning failure as to
addiction”) would not be barred by section 1714.45 (putting aside, of
course, whether or not a plaintiff could actually prove such facts).
To reemphasize the point, when section 1714.45 was adopted in 1987,
95.
96.

See supra Part II.A.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION—A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988).
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it was generally understood in the legal community that the basic
warning defect and design defect claims that were then being brought
were also losers—not because of some particular doctrinal reason, but
rather because of factual problems. That is, like Prosser, judges and
juries in California and elsewhere were just not being convinced that
cigarettes could either be made safer or that people were not fairly aware
of their dangers. Indeed, it was because of this very failure of plaintiffs
to win product liability claims against tobacco companies using either of
the Barker prongs, that made seeking footnote 10-based liability for
cigarettes alluring. Moreover, in this same light, it is easy to see why,
once the footnote 10-based theory of liability was cut off by subsection
(a) of section 1714.45, most observers at the time believed that cigarette
tort litigation was pretty much over.97 Indeed, one might be forgiven for
casually using the word “immunity” in this context. Put differently, if
plaintiffs at that time could not win on existing doctrine, and if they were
prevented from asserting footnote 10’s wider theory of liability, then the
campaign might well have seemed lost.
But it turns out that the way things stood in 1987 is not the way they
stand today. Moreover, perhaps the most promising way for individual
plaintiffs to proceed in 2001 is neither on the ground that cigarettes can
be made safer (since it remains doubtful that such a claim can actually
be sustained) nor on the ground that the tobacco companies failed to
warn as to addiction (for reasons described below), but on the ground
that the tobacco companies engaged in intentional wrongdoing, reckless
misconduct, or fraud. Ironically, this latter line of attack was clearly
opened up as a result of a tobacco industry victory in the United States
Supreme Court in 1992.98
In Cipollone, the United States Supreme Court held that 1969
Congressional amendments to the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act99 preempted state tort claims based on failure to warn
(at least claims brought with respect to warnings made, or not made,
after 1969).100 Of course, even before Cipollone, for reasons already
explained, plaintiffs were having great difficulty with product liability
cases based on failure to warn.101 As a legal matter, not only would they
have to convince jurors that the common warnings seen on billboard and
magazine ads and on the packages themselves were too mild, but also
97. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
98. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
99. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (1994)) (amending the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)).
100. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.
101. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 149–53.
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that a stronger warning would have actually made a difference in the
victim’s smoking behavior—a daunting task. But Cipollone took away
the right even to try to make that case (at least as to post-1969
warnings).102 Note that this decision not only preempted warningrelated complaints about the dangers of smoking (like lung cancer, heart
disease, and so on) but also warning-related complaints about addiction
(again, at least for post-1969 warnings).103 The essence of the United
States Supreme Court’s opinion was that Congress had determined both
what appropriate cigarette warnings were and that there should be a
uniform national system of warnings which would be undercut if state
tort law could, in effect, insist that tobacco companies provide different
warnings.
Nevertheless, the Cipollone Court went out of its way to make clear
that not all possible tort claims against the tobacco companies are
preempted by federal law. Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion specifically
stated that tort claims resting on theories of express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, intentional concealing of facts, conspiracy, and the
like are not preempted.104 As a result of that decision, plaintiffs in
tobacco cases around the nation have increasingly taken to alleging
fraud, conspiracy, and other types of intentional or reckless
wrongdoing—claims that have become somewhat more plausible to
prove in the years since 1990 as secret tobacco company documents
have come to light.105 Indeed, these are among the very claims that
plaintiffs have alleged in Naegele.106
In conclusion, the California Supreme Court should construe section
1714.45 narrowly in the way argued above, and then send the Naegele
102. 505 U.S. at 524.
103. Id. at 530–31.
104. Id. at 526–31.
105. See generally STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996);
PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKE SCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP
(1996); DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDREDYEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP
MORRIS (1996); MIKE A. MALES, SMOKED: WHY JOE CAMEL IS STILL SMILING (1999);
CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK
ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998); MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE RISK: THE
MAVERICKS, THE LAWYERS, AND THE WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHO BEAT BIG TOBACCO
(1999); TARA PARKER-POPE, CIGARETTES: ANATOMY OF AN INDUSTRY FROM SEED TO
SMOKE (2001).
106. Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 669 (Ct. App.
2000), review granted, 11 P.3d 953 (Cal. 2000).
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case back to the trial court to sort out the various claims that were
alleged. Some of those claims, including claims of fraud and related
wrongdoing, should be allowed to go ahead—provided, of course, that
the plaintiffs’ evidence concerning such claims is strong enough to get
them past motions for summary judgment or directed verdict using
normal standards.
Whether plaintiffs, in the end, would win any of these claims is not a
matter that concerns this Article. But the approach recommended here
would provide a coherent, textually sensible, and historically rooted
interpretation of section 1714.45 as it was enacted in 1987.
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